The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970, Second Edition Enlarged,

Kuhn, T.S The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago & London. The University of Chicago Press. 1970. Second Edition.

Thomas Kuhn's aim is to debunk the outdated and ill-fitting descriptions of Science, replacing them with a new understanding provided by a historiographical approach to science study. Kuhn's theory extrapolates the pitfalls of inadequate methodologies that were not, and to this day are not, able answer important questions relating to the history of science. Kahn endeavors to show readers that the true nature of 'Science' has not been properly understood due to a failure to critique 'Science' from the right angle. Kuhn's opinion is that rhetoric and social constructs developed a fake identity, that is, 'Science'; 'Science' does not exist in reality. It is a construct designed to try to explain and argue for the idea that all scientists are working towards the goal of progress using the scientific method. Kuhn does not believe in the scientific method and as such the idea of capital s science falls short. Kuhn's theory is one developed from an analysis of the history of science and it describes the fluid nature of the scientific world; the importance of 'normal science' and the way paradigm shifts work.

Kuhn's thesis is accurate at describing the complex nature of the history of science. But it is let down by inadequate of Kuhn's sometimes wild and vague remarks about revolutions and the inconsistencies found in his work when he writes about paradigms. Overall, the work is decent and lends itself to appraisal for actually thinking outside the square and noticing the pitfalls of 'Science' - post-Kuhnian scientists, historians and philosophers have also been spurred on to rectify the mistakes Kuhn made and their developments have led to a wider and deeper understanding about the nature scientific world; specifically John A. Schuster who explicates that the nature of science is not as black and white as Kuhn believes. (page 136)

In the introduction Kuhn sheds light on problems of science. Immediately it is shown that for a long time society has been drenched in a naive understanding of science bred and shared by ignorant scientists who believe in the simple and wrong idea that all science is moving towards progress through the use of a common scientific method. Kuhn shakes off this idea and in the wake of it he elaborates upon a complex and interesting idea about science that has come not from within the community of science itself, but from without. Kuhn used history to elucidate problems of the scientific community and through this he has shown that science is a fluid creature that has a repeating lifestyle: pre-science, normal science, revolution, normal science 2, revolution, normal science 3, revolution (ad infinitum).

Kuhn then spends several chapters describing the stages of science as he sees them. He starts with the time of 'normal science', elaborating how normal science develops and the role it plays. Kuhn describes 'normal science' as the time when "research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements" is undertaken by scientists. Normal science is the time when scientists engage in problem solving tasks. According to Kuhn the scientists work within the paradigm, it is necessary to do so, because a scientist that is constantly challenging, or does not believe in the truth of the paradigm, cannot do good "puzzle-solving" scientific work. If they don't recognise the puzzle then the puzzle cannot be solved.

In the later half of the book Kuhn spends his time describing anomalies, the crisis point in the timeline of science, the response to the crisis and he finishes with in-depth inspections of scientific revolutions. According to Kuhn anomalies play an important role in developing science because anomalies have the possibility to bring about a paradigm shift. The nature of an anomaly is rather intricate. From different angles it can appear to be different things. An anomaly, basically, is a problem that cannot be answered within the current paradigm. Kuhn accurately points out that sometimes the scientists working within the paradigm do not acknowledge a problem - they believe that there is no anomaly. Whereas other scientists who notice the anomaly and believe it important to solve the anomaly are driven to find ways to solve it that lie outside of the current paradigm. Kuhn explicates that these actions by the rogue scientists will eventually lead to a crisis point - the point where there is a sufficient body of scientists who agree that the current paradigm is unable to solve critical problems. In chapter eight Kuhn explains that "if an anomaly is to evoke crisis, it must usually be more than just an anomaly". What he means here is rather unclear. He goes on to list several different examples of anamolies that brought on crisis and then a paradigm shift and all of them differ. It seems that he himself does not fully understand what, or how, an anomaly changes and becomes "more than just an anomaly". Perhaps it is a metaphysical change that occurs in the hearts and minds of men and women engaged within the society and culture at the time of the crisis? Kuhn uses the example of Wolfgang Pauli's letter to a friend expressing his concern with the state of the paradigm he lived in, saying, "At the moment physics is again terribly confused. In any case, it is too difficult for me, and I wish I had been a movie comediam or something of the sort and never heard of physics". Kuhn then quotes Pauli's words that he wrote five months later, after Heisenberg's matrix mechanics became accessable, and such words elucidate the nature of changing paradigms - subtle, yet important - Pauli wrote "Heisenberg's type of mechanics has again given me hope and joy in life. To be sure it does not supply the solution to the riddle, but I believe it is again possible to march forward." Kuhn does well using these supporting quotations and historical examples to bolster his theory. Chalmers provides another definition of an anomaly. He says that an anomaly is noticed to be important if it is seen to be undermining the fundamentals of a paradigm and at the same time resisting the attempts of scientists within the normal scientific community to dispose of it.(page p4). Chalmers is good at taking Kuhn's words and putting them into a clear and concise form.

So far so good for Kuhn. The problems of his work start to arise when he tries to explicate the paradigm shift. After spending the first half of the book examining and explicating the intricate and complex transition and history of science Kuhn then tries to sum up the issues of two competiting paradigms by using the word "incommensurable". From Kuhn's work it is not entirely clear what he means by this. Chalmers takes up this issue and tries to flesh out Kuhn's argument and theory so as to accurately define what exactly "incommensurable" means. Chalmers explicates that the aim of arguments and discussions that occur by two rival parties trying to profess their paradigm as better than the other should be "persuasion rather than compulsion". Here Chalmers is explicating clearly that what Kuhn means by "incommensurable" is the issue of solving an argument that cannot be solved through rational, logical means. Therefore it comes down to the whims of the two parties involved to finally determine the outcome of the issue. This led to problems within the scientific community due to the way this idea undermines the romantic idea that all science is rational, logical and always progressing. Shuster explains that Kuhn's definition of incommensurable describes the idea that "paradigms do not have single agreed measures". (page 130). Schuster acknowledges that Kuhn should have made clearer what he meant by inconmmensurability because, in his book, Kuhn's lack of clarity leaves one thinking that "one paradigm came from Mars and the other from Venus". (page 131). This problem is one of a small few that plague Kuhn's work in this book.

Kuhn also simplifies the nature of science. He does well in acknowledging the different complex areas of science: new science, crisis, revolution. But he lends himself to an over-simplification because he believes that these times exist one at a time. Schuster, on the other hand, explicates that this is not the case. He believes that there is a far more complex understanding of science to be known - one that blends the areas of new science, crisis and revolution - so that all of these things are occuring at once. Schuster says this is possible because each discovery is a "noticeable alteration" to the paradigm. (age 137). And the idea of a revolution is simply a large discovery. These ideas compliment and adds depth to Kuhn's work.

In conclusion, Kuhn's work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is an interesting and insightful book. His work, althought outdated now, still shows the essence that has lead to greater knowledge about the scientific world. Kuhn's arguments are generally concise and clear, the first half of the book being very detailed, complex and yet accessable. The latter half does lend itself to some intricate issues that are not entirely ironed out by Kuhn, however, Kuhn still succeeds in arguing and presenting his theory in convincing way. The problems that occur in his work were later addressed by Kuhn and by other academics, as such, given the literature that is available, Kuhn's work here is far stronger than it is weak and it is most definitely complimented by a reading of Chalmers' own book and Schuster's study of Kuhn's work.

Talk about revolution from Schutser and Chalmers. Respond to their points. Conclude, fuck yeah boy.